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CRSENOTES
ruled. Failure to do so would result in a serious diminution in the efficacy
of the gift tax, allowing taxpayers the possibility both to transfer large sums
without payment of tax and to avoid the effect of the progressive income
tax rates through income splitting schemes.
THOMAS F. DAILEY
Definition of a Branch Under the McFadden Act: St. Louis County Na-
tional Bank v. Mercantile Trust Company'—Mercantile Trust Company
(Mercantile) is a national banking association with its principal office lo-
cated in St. Louis, Missouri.' In February of 1970, Mercantile, which is en-
gaged in the banking business and operates a trust department, opened a
trust office in Clayton, Missouri, a suburb of St. Louisa Prior to opening
the Clayton office, Mercantile received notice from the Comptroller of the
Currency of the United States (the Comptroller) approving the establish-
ment of the trust office so long as Mercantile did not accept deposits, make
loans or pay checks at the location. Performing such activities would bring
the office within the definition of a branch set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 36(0. 4
Moreoever, the establishment of such a branch office is subject to the limi-
tations of 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) 5
 which permits national banks to establish
branches only if' they are authorized for state banks by the law of the state
in which the national bank intends to open a branch. 6
 Since Mercantile in-
tended to open an office in Missouri and since Missouri law prohibits
branching,' if the Comptroller considered Mercantile's office a branch, its
1 548 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977).
2 /d. at 717.
3 1d.
'Id. Section 36(1) provides:
The term "branch" as used in this section shall be held to include any branch
bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of
business located in any State or Territory of the United States or in the District
of Columbia at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lens,
12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970).
5
 548 F.2d at 717. See note 6 infra.
"Section 36(c) provides in pertinent part:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city,
town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and op-
eration are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the Stale
in question; and (2) at any point within the State in which said association is
situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State
banks by the statute law of the Slate in question by language specifically granting
such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and
subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the Slate on State
banks.
12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
7
 The relevant Missouri statute, Mo. REN. STAT. §362.105.1 (I) (1969) provides that ",
no bank or trust company shall maintain in this state a branch or trust company, or receive
deposits or pay checks except in its own banking house ...." In St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Pemberton, 494 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. App. 1973) a trust company sought, via a declaratory judg-
ment in state court, the authority to establish an office in Clayton to be used in connection
with its exclusive trust business in downtown St. Louis. The company argued that the ref-
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Id.
establishment would be prohibited under section 36(c). Therefore the
Comptroller's ruling that the office was not a branch was crucial for Mer-
cantile.
Relying on the Comptroller's ruling, Mercantile opened its Clayton of-
fice, with five full time employees.° From the spring of 1970 until March of
1973 a trust officer administered approximately 500 living and testamen-
tary trusts, managing agency, and safekeeping accounts.° No checks were
paid, no money was lent, and no deposits were received.'°
St. Louis County National Bank—a state chartered bank—filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri seeking
both a declaratory judgment that Mercantile's Clayton trust office was il-
legal and an injunction against continued use of the office." The district
court granted the injunction, finding that the office was a branch within
the meaning of section 36(f), and thus was subject to section 36(c)'s limita-
tion. 12
 Since Missouri law prohibited branches, Mercantile was prohibited
erence to "trust companies" in section 362.105 could only reasonably be interpreted to apply
to trust companies which are engaged in the banking business and not to companies exercising
trust powers exclusively. Id. at 409-10. The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected this argument
and interpreted the statute to apply an antimonopolistic measure to "all banks, banks exercis-
ing trust powers, and trust companies not exercising banking powers." Id. at 413. It saw St.
Louis Union's reading of the statute as allowing a bank which exercised trust powers to in-
corporate separately its trust department and thus establish many branches as "pure" trust
businesses. The court feared that St. Louis Union, "after establishing its proferred branch,
could start exercising its chartered banking powers [to conduct trust business), thus placing it-
self in the same position as those bank-trust organizations to which it contends Sec. 362.105
applies only, thus being able to do what the latter could not do." Id. The court decided that
such a result was not in keeping with the intendment of the statute. Id.
St. Louis Union also argued that the statute prohibited only a branch trust company,
and not merely a second office. It claimed that none of the true fiduciary activities or de-
cisions would occur in Clayton, but would be done solely at the downtown office. Id. The ac-
tivities which were to be performed in Clayton included interviewing and consulting with pro-
spective customers, consulting with current customers, carrying on record keeping, perform-
ing all operations in acting as transfer agent, acting as paying agent, carrying on a general real
estate business, and giving investment advice with respect to securities and property. Id. at
413-14. The court considered these activities sufficient evidence that the Clayton office was a
"branch" trust company as prohibited by section 362.105. Id. at 416. Accordingly, the court af-
firmed the denial of St. Louiswere requested declaratory judgment.
Thus, if Mercantile were a state bank, its Clayton office which would perform trust ser-
vices would be considered a "branch" under Missouri law. As such it would be prohibited by
section 362.105.
8
 548 F.2d at 717.
° Id.
"'Id. Mercantile did a substantial amount of trust business at its main office in St.
Louis. Id. at 719. The circuit court found the activities performed by Mercantile at its Clayton
office could be summarized as follows:
(1) Consulting] with customers and prospective customers about the trust ser-
vices offered by Mercantile; (2) discussfing) accounts with principals and ben-
eficiaries of existing trusts; (3) reviewing] with customers and their rep-
resentatives proposed trust instruments; (4) providing] a place for persons to
execute wills and trusts which name Mercantile as fiduciary; (5) review[ing] wills
on file for present customers; and (6) researching] estate and trust prob-
lems ... with customers and their representatives.
" St. Louis County National Bank v. Mercantile Trust Co., 420 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Mo.
1976). James E. Smith, the then Comptroller, was joined with Mercantile as a defendant.
Clayton Trust Company and William R. Kostman, Director of the Division of Finance for the
State of Missouri, intervened as plaintiffs. Id. at 512.
"Id.
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from the continued use of its trust office." The court also found that as a
trust office, the Clayton office was established in contravention of Missouri
law." Consequently, the office was prohibited by 12 U.S.C. § 92(a),' 5 which
authorizes the Comptroller to permit national banks to exercise trust pow-
ers only when such exercise is not in contravention of state or local law."
Mercantile appealed the decision of the district court to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. With one judge dissenting,
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court decision" and HELD: (1) the
establishment of such a permanent place of business as undertaken by
Mercantile is a branch as contemplated by 12 U.S.C. § 36(1) and thus is sub-
ject to section 36(c)'s prohibition against branches which are not authorized
for state banks, and (2) Mercantile's exercise of fiduciary powers at its
Clayton trust office is in contravention of Missouri state law and hence in
contravention of 12 U.S.C. § 92(a)."
in finding that the office was prohibited because it was a branch, the
circuit court based its decision on its interpretation of both legislative his-
tory and Supreme Court decisions which show that 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(f) and
(c) were intended to foster "competitive equality" between national and
state banks insofar as branching is concerned." In light of recent Supreme
Court decisions, the court concluded that the three routine banking func-
tions of receiving deposits, paying checks and lending money delineated in
section 36(f) are not the only indicia of branch banking and that on the
facts of the case before it, the Clayton office, by performing trust services,
constituted a branch."
In analyzing the separate issue as to Mercantile's trust powers, the
court determined that section 92(a) permits a state to limit nondiscrimi-
nately the location where such fiduciary powers can be exercised." Since in
' 3 Id.
' Id,
" Section 92(a) provides as follows:
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to grant
by special permit to national banks applying therefore, when not in contravention
of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, administrator, registrar
of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, committee of estates
of lunatics, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust com-
panies, or other corporations which come into competition with national banks
are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank is lo-
cated.
12 U.S.C. § 92(a) (1970),
Section 92(b) provides as follows:
Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit the exercise of any or
all of the foregoing powers by State banks, trust companies, or other corpora-
tions which compete with national banks, the granting to and the exercise of such
powers by national banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of State or
local law within the meaning of this section.
12 U.S.C. 92(b) (1970).
" 420 F. Stipp. at 516.
" 548 F.2d at 720.
" Id. at 719-20.
' 5 Id. at 718-19.
20 1d. at 719.
21 Id. at 720.
375
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
this case a state bank could not operate such an office performing fiduciary
functions, the court concluded that section 92(a) prohibited Mercantile
from doing so.22
Judge Henley dissented on both the branching issue under section
36(f) and the fiduciary issue under section 92(a). With respect to the
branching issue, the dissent expressed the view that the majority was allow-
ing state definition of what constitutes a branch to control the federal ques-
tion of interpreting section 36(0. 25 Judge Henley disagreed with the expan-
sive reading the majority gave to section 36(f), believing that if Congress
had intended to include trust services in the definition of a branch, it
would have done so. 24 Accordingly, Judge Henley concluded, since Con-
gress did not indicate that offices performing trust services were branches
under 36(0, it was improper for the court so to decide. The dissent also
took issue with the majority's reading of section 92(a), noting that 92(a) says
nothing about where fiduciary services may be offered by national banks. 25
Judge Henley believed that unless prohibited by Congress, a federal bank is
not prevented from engaging in particular activity merely because such ac-
tivity is denied to state banks." Thus, he -concluded that the majority was
unwarranted in extending Missouri's prohibition against the operation of
trust offices to federal banks.
• The St. Louis County case is significant because in finding that the trust
office, which performed none of the three functions listed within section
36(f), was a branch, the Eighth Circuit has expanded the concept of a
branch under section 36(0 beyond previous definition. Although prior
cases have held that armored cars, 27 secured receptacles,28 and computer
terminals 29 are branches, each of these decisions has relied upon the func-
tional definition given in section 36(f). The St. Louis County court, however,
has added a fourth activity which is not in the statutory definition—trust
services. Significantly, the court arrived at this definition while maintaining
that state law was not relied upon in determining the content of the term
branch in section 36(0.
This note will first discuss the issue of whether the Clayton office was
a branch as defined in section 36(1). This discussion will focus on the his-
tory of the doctrine of "competitive equality" that the majority found so
persuasive. It will then discuss cases that have applied a "competitive equal-
ity" analysis in other controversies arising under 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) and will
compare those decisions to the extension given section 36(1) by the Si. Louis
County court. The note will then suggest pitfalls that could arise as a result
of this extension. The reasoning of the St. Louis County court in applying
section 92(a) to the trust office will also be discussed. This note will argue
that the court was correct in its extension of section 36(f) despite the possi-
"Id.
"Id. at 721 (Henley, J., dissenting).
"Id,
"Id.
"Id.
" See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 137-38 (1969).
"Id.
" See, e.g., Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
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bility of future difficulties, but that such an extension may have been un-
necessary. It will be suggested that the restrictions imposed upon national
banks by 12 U.S.C. § 92(a) provided sufficient grounds to decide the case,
and thus that the possible future problems caused by the extension of sec-
tion 36(f) could have been avoided.
1. MERCANTILE'S TRUST OFFICE AS A BRANCH UNDER 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c),
36(f)
A. History and Development of "Competitive Equality"
The St. Louis County decision was based on the legislative history of
section 36(f) and the interpretation of 36(1) by courts concerned with main-
taining "competitive equality" between state and national banks. Therefore
the history and development of the doctrine of "competitive equality" is
pertinent to a discussion of St. Louis County.
The doctrine of "competitive equality" developed as a reaction to sev-
eral events in the history of branch banking. The first such event was a
1911 opinion of the Attorney General which restricted each national bank
to one "office or banking house located in the place specified in its organi-
zation certificate." 30
 Despite this opinion, national banks, in order to com-
pete with state banks, offered off premises paying and receiving facilities
known as "teller windows."" In First National Bank v. Missouri," however,
the Supreme Court held that national banks had no authority to utilize
these facilities. 33
 Being limited to one office or banking house, national
banks were thus placed at a disadvantage in those states which allowed state
branch banking.
Recognizing both that the Missouri decision handicapped national
banks, and that "permission for national banks to meet the competition of
State banks engaged in branch banking ... is absolutely vital to the mainte-
nance of the national banking system,"" Congress passed the McFadden
Act in 1927. 35
 At the time of' enactment, Representative McFadden, the au-
thor of the bill, described the main purpose of the act as follows: "As a re-
" 20 Or. Arry GEN. 81 (1911) construing Act of 3 June 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat, 101
(now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 81).
$ In a 1923 opinion of the Attorney General, these windows received a limited ap-
proval. See 34 O. AT1-Y GEN. 1 (1923).
" 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
33
 Id. at 656-58.
34 65 CONG. REC. 11298 (1924).
an Act of 25 Feb. 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Slat, 1224.
The First National Bank Court was resolving the attorney general's conflicting in-
terpretations of the National Bank Act of 1864 regarding the power of national banks to es•
tablish branches. 263 U.S. at 658 & n.l. The opinion placed national banks at a handicap in
states where branching was permitted for state chartered banks, In describing the conditions
after the decision, a House Report said that "[title present situation is intolerable to the na-
tional banking system. The bill [which became the McFadden Act] proposes the only practica-
ble solution .. . by permitting national banks to have branches in those cities where State banks
are allowed to have them under State laws." H.R. REP. No. 83, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1926).
For a further discussion of the history leading to the passage of the McFadden Act, see In-
dependent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 930.32 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 862 (1976); 39 Fed. Reg. 44416 (1974).
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suit of the passage of this act, the national bank act has been so amended
that national banks are able to meet the needs of modern industry and
commerce and competitive equality has been established among all member
banks of the Federal Reserve system."36
Thus the concept of "competitive equality" in branch banking was
conceived. In the 1966 case of First National Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co.," the Supreme Court applied this principle of "competitive equality" to
section 36(c). In Walker, two national banks attempted to establish branches
in a manner which was prohibited to Utah state banks. 38 A Utah statute
permitted branch banking only to the extent that an existing bank acquired
a bank which itself had been operating for five years. 39 The Comptroller
argued that since the Utah statute permitted some type of branching, sec-
tion 36(c) did not prevent federal banks from branching. 4° Furthermore,
the restriction limiting branching solely to the takeover of an existing bank,
the Comptroller maintained, was not applicable to national banks. 4 ' The
Supreme Court rejected this argument and read the legislative history of
the McFadden Act to mean that state and national banks should compete
on the basis of "competitive equality," thereby precluding one system from
having branching privileges not available to the other.'" Accordingly, the
Court stated:
It appears clear from the ... legislative history of § 36(c) (1) and
(2) that Congress intended to place national and state banks on a
basis of "competitive equality" insofar as branch banking was
concerned .... It is not for us to so construe the Acts as to frus-
trate this clear-cut purpose so forcefully expressed by both
friend and foe of the legislation at the time of its adoption.'"
Moreover, the Court concluded, the concept of "competitive equality"
required that state law control as to the "method" of branching allowed.
Such method, the Court held, was part and parcel of Utah's policy, "and
was absorbed by the provisions of §§ 36(c) (1) and (2), regardless of the tag
placed upon it."44
 The Court then determined that a state's control of
branching "method" included control as to how, where, and when a na-
tional bank may branch. 45
Thus, the Walker Court established that "competitive equality" is to be
a factor in interpreting sections 36(c) (1) and (2) of the McFadden Act, and
that the restrictions imposed upon state banks as to whether and where
they may branch apply to national banks. However, it did not decide to
what extent competitive equality applied to the definition of a branch under
section 36(f). That issue was addressed three years later in First National
Bank v. Dickinson. 46
88 68 CONG. REC, 5815 (1927) (emphasis added).
" 385 U.S. 252 (1966).
3" Id. at 253.
39 1d.
40 1d, at 261.
41 Id.
42 1d. at 259-61.
49 Id. at 261.
"id. at 262.
45 /d.
' 6
 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
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In Dickinson a national bank had received permission from the
Comptroller to operate two' services for the convenience of its customers:
one was an armored car service which delivered cash and received funds
for deposit on a daily basis and the other was an off premise receptacle for
the receipt of packages containing cash and checks for deposit.'" The
Florida Banking Commissioner advised the bank that the proposed de-
pository under construction and the armored car service each would violate
Florida's prohibition against branch banking." The bank then sought, in
federal court, a declaratory judgment that its proposed services did not
constitute branching and were, therefore, permitted under federal law de-
spite Florida's prohibition on branch banking."
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, recognized that in foster-
ing competitive equality, the "[McFadden Act] has incorporated by re-
ference the limitations which state law places on branch banking activities
by state banks."5° He described "[t]he mechanism of referring to state law
[as] simply one designed to implement that congressional intent and build
into the federal statute a seIf-executing provision to accommodate to
changes in state regulation."5 ' However, the Dickinson opinion explicitly re-
jected any contention that a state's definition of branch "must control the
content of the federal definition of § 36(f)."52 The Chief Justice made it
very clear that the definition of a branch under section 36(1) was a matter
of federal law:
Admittedly, state law comes into play in deciding how, where,
and when branch banks may be operated, Walker Bank, supra, for
in § 36(c) Congress entrusted to the States the regulation of
branching as Congress then conceived it. But to allow the States
to define the content of the term "branch" would make them the
sole judges of their own powers. Congress did not intend such
an improbable result, as appears from the inclusion in § 36 of a
general definition of "branch."53
This language suggests that even though state law may be influential in de-
ciding if a national bank may open a branch under section 36(c), it should
not be controlling in deciding what a branch is under section 36(f).
The Court then addressed the question of the proper definition of
"branch" under section 36(f). In searching legislative history for guidance
in interpreting section 36(f), the Court noted that Representative McFad-
den had described a branch as qa]ny place outside of or away from the
main office where the bank carries on its business of receiving deposits,
paying checks, lending money, or transacting any business carried on at the
main office Relying on this description, the Court stated, in lan-
guage that has particular significance to the St. Louis County decision, that
section 36(f):
47 1d. at 125, 127.
" Id. at 129.
" Id.
" Id. at 131.
1" id. at 133.
" Id.
"Id. at 133-34.
" Id. at 134 n.8, quoting 68 CONG. REC. 5816 (1927).
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defines the minimum content of the term "branch" [and] by use
of the word "include" the definition suggests a calculated in-
definiteness with respect to the outer limits of the term. How-
ever, the term "branch bank" at the very least includes any place
for receiving deposits or paying checks or lending money apart
from the chartered premises; it may include more. 55
Furthermore, the Chief Justice stated that the definition of branch
must not be given a restrictive meaning which would frustrate the congres-
sional intent of "competitive equality" found by the Court in Walker." In
construing "branch" under section 36(f), the Court noted that a competitive
advantage would accrue to a federal bank which provided the service of re-
ceiving money for deposit at a place away from its main office when such a
service was prohibited to state banks." The Court was satisfied that when a
customer delivered money to either the armored car or the receptacle, the
bank, for purposes of section 36(f), had received a deposit. 58 Therefore,
under federal law, these services fit the description of branches, and as
such were prohibited because they constituted an attempt to secure branch-
ing privileges which Florida denied to its competing state banks."
The Dickinson decision is pertinent to a discussion of St. Louis County
for three reasons. First, in Dickinson, the Court determined that the three
functions listed in section 36(f) establish only the minimum content of the
term "branch," and that the actual definition of that term may include
other functions not specifically listed in the statute. Second, the Dickinson
Court established that "competitive equality" may be considered in the fed-
eral definition of branch under section 36(1). Third, the Court rejected ap-
plying a state's definition of branch in arriving at a federal definition of
that term under 36(f). Thus, in what appears to be an incongruity, while
rejecting applying a state's definition of branch in arriving at a federal
definition, the Court decided that in order to maintain "competitive equal-
ity," the federal definition of "branch" was influenced by the fact that if na-
tional banks could accept deposits they would have an advantage over state
banks which could not. However, the Dickinson Court did not indicate how
"competitive equality" could be assured without taking into consideration the
state definition of branch. These then were the confused guidelines the St.
Louis County court was left to follow.
B. "Competitive Equality" as Applied in St. Louis County
The St. Louis County majority discussed the concept of "competitive
equality" but did not expressly base its decision on an application of that
doctrine. Rather, the court chose to rely upon its interpretation of the
meaning of the definition of "branch" contained in section 36(0. The court
noted that the Clayton office of Mercantile Trust Company performed
none of the listed functions of a branch—receiving deposits, paying checks
or loaning money." However, the St. Louis County majority broadened the
55 Id, at 135.
" Id. at 134.
6 7 Id. at 137.
" Id.
" Id. at 137-38.
U 548 F.2d at 717.
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definition of "branch" beyond those three functions. In doing so, the court
was very careful to point out., that it was relying on the McFadden Act,
congressional intent and federal judicial construction but not on the defini-
tion given by Missouri law." It noted that section 36(1) defines a branch to
include the three functions listed." In addition, the court noted that the
Supreme Court in Dickinson stated that the word "include" suggests a "cal-
culated indefiniteness with respect to the outer limits" of the term branch,
and that services of a branch bank "may include more" than the three
listed functions." Accordingly, the St. Louis County court concluded that
"accepting deposits, paying checks or fending money are not the only in-
dicia of branch," since modern branch banking typically provides many
other services.'" Since the performance of trust services is a typical banking
function, the court held that the trust office was a branch as contemplated
by section 36(1).
The court. found further support for its expanded definition of a
branch office in a comment made by Representative McFadden that a
branch included a place in which the bank "transacted] any business car-
ried on at [its] main office." 16 The court noted that Mercantile Trust con-
ducted a substantial amount of trust business at its main office." Thus
since the trust activity in Clayton closely paralleled the trust work con-
ducted at Mercantile's main office, the court found that the Clayton office
came within the definition of "branch" as set forth by Representative
McFadden, 68
In dissent, Judge Henley observed that the McFadden Act was passed
for the purpose of enabling national banks to compete, and that the Act
was not meant to restrict their operations." He also argued that Congress
was well aware of trust departments in 1927 and if it had intended to in-
clude trust business in its definition of branch it would have done so." Ad-
ditionally, Judge Henley contended that a facility is not a branch merely
because it performs some function or furnishes some service, other than
accepting deposits, cashing checks, and making loans, which banks cus-
tomarily provide."
It is submitted that the position advanced by Judge Henley in dissent
lacks support. The dissent's view of the McFadden Act as enabling legisla-
tion may have had validity if the majority's holding had been based solely
upon the doctrine of "competitive equality." However, as noted earlier, the
majority listed other reasons for determining that the office was a branch
under section 36(0. 72 With respect to congressional awareness of trust de-
" Id. at 720.
62 hi at 718.
63 Id., quoting Dickinson, 396 U.S. at 135.
" 548 F.2d at 719.
" Id, at 719-20.
66 Id. at 718-19. See text at note 54 supra.
" Id. at 719-20. See note 10 supra.
"Id. at 720.
" Id. at 721 (Henley, J., dissenting).
71' Id.
"
72 See text at notes 60-68 supra.
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partments in 1927, it should be noted that Representative McFadden was
quite clear in his statement that an office conducting any business carried
on at the main office was a branch." The dissent ignored this statement as
well as the volume and scope of business conducted in Clayton that was
also performed at the main office."
Finally, the dissent's point that a facility is not a branch merely be-
cause it performs some function or furnishes some service other than the
three services enumerated in 36(1) appears to be an attempt to counter the
Dickinson Court's view that the definition of branch is not limited to those
three functions. The dissent's observation may be well taken in the context
of a facility that performs activities not directly related to banking, such as
advertising for a charitable group. However, if the dissent does not believe
that offering trust services rises above "merely" providing customary func-
tions, it is difficult to conceive of what, if any, activities other than those
within the four corners of 36(0, would be sufficient to constitute branch
banking.
In view of the majority's analysis of the language of the McFadden
Act, congressional intent, and federal judicial construction and the preced-
ing discussion of the dissenting opinion, it appears that the St. Louis County
court correctly decided that Mercantile's office was a branch. The im-
balance in "competitive equality" that would have resulted was too great to
allow Mercantile to continue the operation of the Clayton trust office. The
court went a step beyond the language and previous interpretation of sec-
tion 36(f), but the maintenance of "competitive equality" dictated the result.
. The court's reasoning, however, did not explain the proper role of
state law in reaching a federal definition of "branch." The court was quite
explicit in not relying on state law, which is consistent with Dickinson, 75 but
at some point this court may need to look to state law in analyzing "com-
petitive equality" under section 36(f). For example, there could be conflict-
ing interpretations of section 36(f) within the Eighth Circuit should a case
similar to St. Louis County be brought in a state that prohibits branch bank-
ing, but does not define trust offices as branches, thus allowing the kind of
trust office that Mercantile had opened. The court would have to decide
Whether competitive inequality would exist if national banks were not
allowed to use such a facility. If competitive equality were threatened, the
court would be required to find that the trust office was not a branch under
section 36(1) in that particular state in order to allow the national bank to
compete without being in violation of section 36(c). Yet, within Missouri,
which is also in the Eighth Circuit, this kind of office is a branch. Would
this mean, then, that unlike roses, a branch is not a branch?
A similar inconsistency could result if, hypothetically, Missouri
changed its statute to eliminate any restrictions on branching, or if the state
ruled that trust offices are not branches for purposes of state law. The ef-
fect would be that Missouri law would not consider trust offices as pro-
hibited branches. Hence Missouri banks would not be prohibited from
opening such trust offices. Yet since Mercantile's trust office was defined as
73
 See text at note 54 supra.
"See text and note 10 supra.
" 548 F.2d at 720.
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a branch by the federal court, and since Missouri still prevented branching,
Mercantile would be prohibited by section 36(c) from operating its
"branch." Thus Missouri banks would be conducting business in a manner
prohibited to national banks, and competitive equality would be threatened.
If competitive equality is to be achieved, it would appear ill-advised
not to consider what limitations or privileges are applicable to state banks if'
national banks are to compete with them. Indeed, in fostering competitive
equality, courts have looked to state law in analyzing section 36(f). The
Eighth Circuit was quite explicit in relying on a state definition of branch
in Nebraskans for Independent Banking v. Omaha Nat'l Bank." In ruling that a
challenged drive-in and walk-in facility was a branch and not an extension
of the main bank," the appeals court stated that the district court was in
error for disregarding the
indispensable role state law must play in applying the federal
definition of "branch" in order to maintain competitive equality.
By force of the language of § 36(c) itself, the fact that a state
bank would not be permitted to operate the challenged facility in
addition to its other existing facilities, must take precedence as a
decision criterion over the many administratively and judicially
conceived factors discussed above."
A concurring opinion and a vigorous dissent in which Judge Henley joined,
rejected this reliance upon state law to determine the definition of a branch
under federal law."
Another case which suggests looking to state law is Independent Bankers
Ass'n of America v. Smith." The issue in that case was whether customer-
bank communication terminals (CBCT's)81 were branches, and the court
found that in fact they were. 82 A footnote in the opinion is particularly rel-
evant to a discussion of Si. Louis County and the role of state law in the fed-
eral definition of branch. The court described a hypothetical situation in
which a state would prohibit branching but classify CBCT's as non-
branches." This would allow state banks to install CBCT's where they were
denied to national banks because CBCT's were defined as branches accord-
ing to federal law. The court rejected a narrow construction of section
36(c) in such a situation for two reasons. The First was the belief that the
Comptroller can consider a state's administrative ruling or opinion "in-
T° 530 F.2d 755 (8th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 426 U.S. 310 (1976).
" 530 F.2d at 763.
78 Id.
79 Id, at 764-67. This may explain the reluctance of the St. Louis County court not to
place such reliance on state law, but Judge Henley in his dissent in St. Louis County believed
the court again had relied improperly on the state's definition of branch. See text at notes
69-71 supra.
8° 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
"' The device is activated by a customer card. Access to the machine usually is achieved
by inserting the card and keying in a personalized identification number that is unique to that
customer. The devices may be installed in bank lobbies, shopping centers, factories, supermar-
kets or any other place a bank wishes to provide a service to its customers. Depending upon
the capabilities of the machine, it may he tied directly into a computer system or be operated
in an "off-line" mode. In the off-line mode, the transactions are accumulated on a magnetic
tape or disk for subsequent entry into the computer system.
"' 534 F.2d at 951-52.
95 Id. at 948-49 n.I04.
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terpreting the state's branching laws so long as that opinion does not violate
the anti-branching standard imposed by the statute law of the state" The
second reason was that a narrow reading of section 36(c) would engender
the precise form of competitive inequality the McFadden Act was designed
to prevent." The court did not want to frustrate congressional intent by
allowing states to manipulate statutes and rulings to gain an advantage over
national banks." Accordingly, in preventing the frustration of congres-
sional intent, the court would not hesitate to rely on state law in deciding
what constitutes a branch under a federal definition.
Clearly therefore, it would not have been unprecedented for the St.
Louis County court to look to state law in maintaining competitive equality.
However, there must also be a recognition of the inconsistent results that
may occur in achieving this equality. The dilemma of the possible in-
consistencies is a result of the language of the McFadden Act and the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the act, particularly in the Dickinson case, in
which the Court was insistent that state law would not define the federal
definition of the term "branch" in section 36(f). It has been eight years
since Dickinson was decided and it may be time for the Court to give a new
interpretation to "competitive equality." It has been fifty years since the
McFadden Act was written, and it may also be time for Congress to address
the problem in light of current developments. If an alternative to the pres-
ent branching laws and the courts' interpretation of these laws is not forth-
coming, an inconsistency could arise as in the hypothetical situation of a
change in Missouri law, where a court may rule one day that some combi-
nation of bricks and mortar is a branch and the next day rule that it is not.
Theoretically the same court that decided St. Louis County could face such a
dilemma.
II. FIDUCIARY POWERS OF MERCANTILE TRUST UNDER 12 U.S.C. §92(a)
The Clayton office that was opened by Mercantile was different from
other facilities that have been declared branches because it performed only
trust services. Thus its establishment was challenged not only under the
banking statutes governing branches, but also under the statute governing
fiduciary powers. This statute had its beginning in a provision of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act of 1913 which granted the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System the authority to supervise national banks applying
for fiduciary powers." Previously, national banks had no authority to act in
a fiduciary capacity. In 1962, a new section of the act, now codified as 12
U.S.C. § 92(a), transferred the supervisory authority from the Board of
Governors to the Comptroller of the Currency."" The Comptroller now has
84 id
85 Id.
'6 Id. For a general discussion of this CBOT classification problem and the relation of
the McFadden Act definition of "branch" to state laws, see Note, Customer Bank Communication
Terminals Under the McFadden Act, 47 U. Cow. L. Rix. 765 (1976). For a criticism of the in-
consistencies that could arise in maintaining "competitive equality," see Note, Customer-Bank
Communication Terminals and the McFadden Act Definition of a "Branch Bank," 42 U. Cut. L. REV.
362, 381-84 (1975). •
87 Act of 23 Dec. 1913, ch. 6 § 11(R), 38 Stat. 251, 262.
"" Act of 28 Sept. 1962, P.L. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668, codified in 12 U.S.C. 92(a) (1970).
See note 15 supra for the text of the statute.
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the authority under section 92(a) to grant fiduciary powers to national
banks "when not in contravention of State or local law."" This condition
imposed upon the activities of national banks has been interpreted to mean
that in enacting section 92(a), "Congress intended to create the same kind
of 'competitive equality' with regard to trust services" that it intended to
create in branch banking. 9"
The majority in the St. Louis County case subscribed to this view that
competitive equality was incorporated into section 92(a)." Since Missouri
banks were not allowed more than one location for exercising fiduciary
powers, the court reasoned that "to allow Mercantile to accomplish what a
state bank could. not would frustrate the purpose of section 92(a)." 92 It thus
concluded that Mercantile's Clayton trust office was in contravention of
state law within the meaning of section 92(a)."
Judge Henley's dissent reasoned that the majority's reading of 92(a)
suffered from the same defect of expansion used in interpreting section
36(0. 94 Judge Henley pointed out that 92(a) says nothing about prohibiting
where fiduciary services might be offered." 5 He .believed that sections 36
and 92(a) were not passed for the purpose of restricting national banks, but
rather to enable national banks to compete with state banks. 96 In his opin-
ion, the solution to the Clayton trust office situation was state enabling
legislation to allow Missouri banks to compete with Mercantile Trust."
The majority opinion stands on even firmer footing in finding Mer-
cantile's trust. office was in "contravention of State or local law" under sec-
tion 92(a) than it was in finding that the office was a branch under section
36(f). In its interpretation of section 36(f), the majority had to read into the
statute an activity—trust services—not specifically listed in the definition of
a branch. It. did so by an expansion of the word "include" in section 36(f).
In contrast, since Missouri banks could not operate more than one place of
business for their exercise of fiduciary powers," the Clayton trust office
was squarely "in contravention of State or local law" under section 92(a).
99 Section 92(b) provides that if' state banking institutions have such powers, then the
exercise of these powers by national banks is not in contravention of State or local law.
a° American Trust Co. v. South Carolina State Bd. of Bank Control, 381 F. Stipp. 313,
323 (D.S.C. 1974); accord, Blaney v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 357 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1966). See S.
REP. No. 2039, 87th Cong., 2d Sess, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE GONG, & Au. NEWS, 2755,
2736, where the report in commenting on section 92(a) affirms the principles underlying the
dual banking system. In New Hampshire Bankers Ass'n v. Nelson, 336 F. Supp. 1330
(D.N.H.) affd, 460 F.2d 307, 308 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972), suit was brought
challenging a New Hampshire statute prohibiting trust companies, similar organizations or na-
tional banks front advertising that they were authorized to act as executors. 336 F. Supp. at
1332. The district court decided that there is no inherent right of banks to advertise, and
since the statute did not discriminate in its law on advertising, it did not place national or state
banks at a competitive disadvantage for fiduciary business under section 92(a). 336 F, Supp. at
1334-35.
1' 1 548 F.2d at 720.
as
a' Id.
94 Id. at 721 (Henley, J., dissenting).
95 Id.
"Id,
"Id. at 722.
99 See note 7 supra.
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Because the trust office was prohibited by section 92(a), the court
could have avoided the problem of defining a "branch" under section 36(f).
The only determination the court had to make under section 92(a) was that
the same fiduciary capacity—conducting trust business in more than one
location—was denied to state banks." Although state law defined such an
office as a branch,'°° the court did not need to rely on that fact to find that
an office conducting trust business away from the main office was "in con-
travention of State" law.'°' Such a finding could result regardless of
whether federal law defined such an office as a branch. The court appears
to recognize this point in its analysis of the 92(a) violation. Nowhere in the
court's discussion of the trust office in relation to 92(a) does it describe the
office as a branch.'° 2 It only finds that since a state bank cannot operate
the same kind of office, Mercantile's office is in contravention of state law
and hence prohibited by 92(a). 103 In finding this violation of 92(a) it places
no reliance at all upon its previous determination that the office was a
branch. This non-reliance is quite appropriate because the statute does not
require a determination that the office is a branch to find the 92(a) viola-
tion.
Thus, for a disposition of the case; the extension of section 36(1) was
unnecessary. The court could have avoided the possible future inconsistent
results that have been described by basing its holding on a finding that sec-
tion 92(a) had been violated, and therefore that the trust office was not au-
thorized.
CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit quite appropriately decided that the office per-
forming trust services in St. Louis County was in violation of federal law.
However, in finding that the office was a "branch" the court may have
forced itself into a position where on similar facts in another case it would
be forced to make an inconsistent decision. This inconsistency could arise
because of the impact of state law upon the federal definition of "branch."
For that reason this note suggests that the court did not need to find that
the Clayton trust office was a branch and hence prohibited by section 36(c).
To decide the case it was not necessary to find a branch in order for there
to be a violation of 92(a). Therefore it is submitted that the extended in-
terpretation of section 36(f), with all of its potential for judicial headaches,
was unnecessary.
THOMAS J. UMW
°° See 12 U.S.C. 92(a) at note 15 supra.
I" See note 7 supra.
'°' 12 U.S.C. ii 92(a). See note 15 supra.
10 ' See 548 F.2d at 720.
1 °3 Id.
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